This paper is concerned with methods for analysing patterns of conflict. We survey dynamic games, differential games, and simulation as alternative ways of extending the standard static economic model of conflict to study patterns of conflict dynamics, giving examples for each type of model.
Introduction
The rise of game theory in the quantitative social sciences has made considerable potential available for the scientific study of conflict. There exist a large number of applications of game theory (as well as economic theory at large) to particular conflicts and to patterns of conflict in general. 1 While much of this literature appears static in nature, conflict is inherently dynamic. The very idea of "seizing the initiative", so prevalent in strategic thought, remains incomprehensible without a dynamic model. The present paper sets out to survey, and to assess, the avenues open to economic, quantitative analysis in the research area of conflict dynamics. All in all, the present paper is probably best de-scribed by the artificial term "surcept", meaning that a partial survey of the literature is combined with new research to demonstrate in which direction a particular body of literature might be developed.
We follow BOULDING (1962) in contrasting conflict to Pareto-improvements and GARFINKEL and SKAPERDAS (2007) in noting that the essence of conflict is the use of resources for appropriation rather than production and consumption activities. However, the question of why and how conflict arises does not concern us primarily, and we do not look for ways to "resolve" conflict in the manner of peace studies. Our objective is to assess alternative ways of modelling conflict in the realm of economics, with an emphasis on patterns of conflict.
To achieve this, we consider dynamic games, differential games, and simulation as alternative ways of extending the standard static economic model of conflict to study patterns of conflict dynamics, and we provide examples for each type of model. In this article, our main focus lies on the limits of the different types of models while the ultimate aim of the exercise is to model dynamic patterns of conflict that are historically plausible and may serve as a basis for a taxonomy of dynamic conflictakin to the well-known taxonomy of static 2 Â 2 game forms. 2 We find that a "pure theory" approach is likely insufficent, and argue for simulation studies as a preferred research strategy. In addition to the move away from closed-form solutions, our simulation approach is also based on a model of bounded rationality.
We will start by looking at some static models (section 2) which are helpful in explaining the waste of resources in conflicts but generally take the emergence of conflict as given. We then move on to discuss the natural way to extend these models in a dynamic setting (section 3). Modeling incomplete information can explain intensification (or emergence) of conflicts, but the methods impose technical constraints, greatly limiting the situations we can analyse. Finally, we will move to simulation studies with boundedly rational agents (section 4), providing an example for the direction we think quantitative analysis of conflict dynamics can progress the most in. 3 2. Background: simple static models of conflict Let us begin by briefly discussing static models in conflict economics to provide a background for our main argument. 4 The economic analysis of conflict typically rests on two pillars, namely the application of (non-cooperative) game theory as a method 194 Á Klaus B. Beckmann and Lennart Reimer
See RAPOPORT et al. (1976) for the seminal monograph. Sub-section 2.1 will provide a shorter, and in some ways alternative, taxonomy.
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We are indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting this account of the explanatory focus of the methods we analyse in the present paper, and of model selection.
of analysis and the use of a contest success function to summarize the technology of conflict (i. e., as ananalogue of the production function in price theory). We will consider both in turn.
2Â2 games and the taxonomy of conflict
Define a game form to be a set of games that share (a) the same players, (b) the same physical actions, (c) the same payoff functions mapping outcomes -as combinations of physical actions -into utilities. The difference between a game form and the games in it is that we leave information sets, the order of moves, possible repetition and the imposition of (decision) rules unspecified (BECKMANN, 2007, p. 191) . If there are two players with two strategies each, a game form can be represented by the familiar 2 Â 2 matrix.
Such matrices have often been used to exemplify situations that represent a particular pattern, or type, of conflict. A complete taxonomy of strictly ordinal 2 Â 2 games is described in the seminal work by RAPOPORT et al. (1976) 5 For the purpose of classifying situations of conflict, the following disctinction could be made based on whether particular outcomes are Pareto efficient: 6 1. Total conflict. In these constant-sum game forms, all outcomes are Pareto efficient.
These game forms would typically be found at the tactical and operational levels in symmetric military conflict. 2. Mixed-motive game forms (the term is due to SCHELLING, 1960) , which include all situations that are neither zero sum nor coordination games. Consider the outcomes that would be Nash equilibria in pure strategies in a single-shot game with simultaneous moves and call them "candidates". We can then distinguish three cases: (a) All candidates are Pareto-inefficient. The typical example for this case is the Prisoner's Dilemma, and a standard application would be the analysis of arms races at the strategic level of the Cold War (BRITO and INTRILLIGATOR, 1995) . (b) Candidates are efficient, but there is at least one other efficient outcome. The best-known case in point is Chicken.
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RAPOPORT et al. (1976 implicitly use the concept of a game form as well. Observe how they use repeated play and deviations to classify solutions of the game as "vulnerable". We do not share their intuition for stability, however, and are interested in the analysis of conflict rather than games in general. One consequence is that we need to consider games where there is no strict ordinal ranking between outcomes from the vantage point of players -the so-called "impure" games (RAPOPORT et al., 1976, pp. 30-31) . This leads to a domain of 732 distinct 2 Â 2 games (GUYER and HAMBURGER, 1968) , for which no full taxonomy has yet been given.
(c) Candidates are Pareto-better than all other outcomes. This case is exemplified by the Volunteer's Dilemma (DIEKMANN, 1985) (where candidates weakly dominate the other outcomes) and by the Battle of the Sexes (where both candidates are strictly better than the other outcomes).
Roughly speaking, we would expect the categories above to be listed in a descending order of "difficulty" in conflict resolution, other things being equal. If we want to use this kind of taxonomy as a starting point for classifying patterns of dynamic conflict, we might proceed in two ways (which are not mutually exclusive): first, one can look for analogous structure -and "typical" paths -in conflict dynamics; second, one might pursue the idea that different game forms can underlie the various phases of any conflict, and use the change from one form to the next as a way of capturing its dynamics. We give some examples for the first approach when discussing our simulation results (subsection 4.2). The second idea is left for future research.
The production technology of conflict: contest success functions
Many applications of game theory to the analysis of conflict lack a rich specification of the various options available to the parties. Instead, strategic choices are starkly represented by a continuous variable f i denoting the fighting effort of party i. If we take this route, we require a conflict technology π i ¼ π i ðf 1 ; . . . ; f n Þ mapping the fighting efforts of the n contestants into payoffs π. One part of this mapping is the contest success function, which in turn maps the f s into the probability of victory p.
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The "classical" contest success function shown in eq. (1) below was pioneered in the rent-seeking literature (TULLOCK, 1987) .
where the probability of i winning the prize is basically equal to the ratio of i's effort to the overall effort expended on fighting. m is a parameter designed to reflect economies of scale in fighting.
As an example, consider a winner-takes-all scenario where the successful party receives all the resources not expended on fighting. Let all the risk-neutral contestants be identical, assume m ¼ 1 and normalize their endowments to unity. The expected payoff of any contestant i is then given by
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With Nash behavior, differentiating with respect to f i and simplifying, we obtain the first-order condition for an interior solution 8 which we then solve for f i to obtain reaction functions
for all i 2 f1 . . . ng. In an interior symmetric Nash equilibrium, we have f
with the usual conclusions: (a) warfare is a negative sum game, (b) additional competition will lead to harder fighting ( lim n!1 nÀ1 n ¼ 1), and by the same token, the deadweight loss of fighting (or legal efforts, or lobbying) increases in n.
Other contest success functions have been explored in the literature, most notably the logistic type, where the probability of victory depends on the difference rather than the ratio of efforts expended (HIRSHLEIFER, 2001 ).
Lessons for further discussion
One major lesson to be learned from the economic literature on static conflict is that the same formal model can typically be applied to a number of different topics in conflict theory, often both violent and non-violent. For example, the analysis expounded in sub-section 2.2 was applied to lobbying (TULLOCK, 1987) as well as to arms races (FAERON, 2011) . Although claims to have boiled conflict down to the prisoners' dilemma, the stag game (SKYRMS, 2004) or the volunteer's dilemma (DIEK- MANN, 1985) are overstated, a small number of game types still appears to cover most applications, and this suggest looking for a typology in dynamic games as well.
Secondly, it appears natural to hope for a direct extension of static models to guide research on conflict dynamics. That is, it seems natural to try and extend the wellknown static models in conflict economics sketched above by adding a time dimension, distinguishing different periods of time and sequences of moves and countermoves. We will provide examples of this approach in the following section 3, one of them entirely new, and argue that the limits of available mathematical theory to serve as an underpinning frustrate all hopes for this "natural" approach. (1965) used the term "differential games" for all game theoretic efforts that contain a time index. Modern usage, however, follows Isaacs' earlier practice of restricting this term to multi-agent strategic control problems in continuous time, while Dynamics of military conflict: an economics perspective Á 197
Dynamic extensions of standard models: examples and critique

ISAACS
the discrete-time version, which typically adds asymmetric information, is generally known as "dynamic games" (ISAACS, 1954) . These two make up the avenues of research under scrutiny, and we will consider an example for each in turn.
The emergence of war in dynamic games
A typical example of the use of dynamic games in conflict theory is the model by DARTZKE et al. (2003) , which explains the outbreak of war using a variant of CHO and KREPS (1987) 's "quiche" signalling game. Asymmetric information regarding players' characteristics leads to mixed-strategy equilibria, in which the probability of war occurring is positive. We demonstrate this type of argument using a modified version of the model in GARTZKE et al. (2003) (see the game tree in figure 1 on page 7).
Country B disputes country A's ownership of a resource, whose (joint) valuation is unity. Country B can demand a share d of the resource, to which country A responds either by acquiescing to the demand, or by fighting. Waging war carries an identical cost c for both countries, and the probability a of the defender's (B's) winning is exogenously given. We assume that in case of war, the winning side receives the entire resource.
There are two types of country B: strong and weak. The sole difference between the two is that strong Bs have a higher probability of winning the war (a s > a w ). While country B knows its own type, country A knows only the distribution of types, i. e. the ex ante probability p of the strong type. B, however, can send a signal about their strength by engaging in a military exercise at an additional cost h.
The sequence of play is as follows:
1. Country A moves first and decides whether or not to conduct the exercise. 2. Country B observes the signal (if any) and formulates its demand d 2 ½0; 1. 3. Country A decides whether to fight or to pay. If there is a fight, combat is carried out as described above, and the victor obtains the entire resource; if A decides to avoid fighting, B's proposal is implemented. We now construct a mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game by proceeding in five steps: (Step 1) Start at the final sub-games and roll back. Note that the maximum demand d Ã that leaves a strong A just indifferent between fighting back or not is
(
Step 2) Let ϕ (ψ) be the ex post probability B accords to the fact that A is strong, having observed an exercise (no exercise). Observe that it is always optimal to demand more if your opponent caves in. Therefore, A has three options at the upper information set: Note the first alternative is dominated by the second as ϕ 1.
(Step 3) Argue likewise for B's lower information set.
(Step 4) Observe that step 2 implies that a weak A never has to fight. Therefore, this type lacks any incentive to demonstrate strength and we have prob ðhjwÞ ¼ 0.
(Step 5) In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, B must be indifferent between his remaining pure strategies. From step 2, we know that this implies 1 þ ð1 À 2ϕÞ c À a w À ϕða s À a w Þ ¼ 1 þ c À a s . From Bayes' Law, we also have ϕ ¼ prob ðhjsÞ p prob ðhjsÞ p þ prob ðhjwÞ ð1 À pÞ Using step 4, we can solve the two equations to find
This establishes our equilibrium. The main conclusions from this analysis are that • as c ") d ", war cannot be avoided by increasing its cost symmetrically.
9
• Rather, war arises through asymmetric or incomplete information.
• From equation (3), we see that the model predicts a strong type to demonstrate the more, 1. the higher the capability differential a s À a w , 2. the lower its ex ante probability p, and 3. the lower the cost of fighting c.
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The standard model of resource conflict developed by SKAPERDAS (2006) also predicts settlement in the absence of inconsistent expectations, commitment problems, and malevolence. Note, however, that the classical liberal hypothesis that trade reduces (violent) conflict receives some empirical support summarized in the textbook by ANDERTON and CARTER (2009) . Resolving this debate need not concern us here.
Note that the construction of an equilibrium does not show that it is the only one. In fact, it is well known that signalling games of the quiche type exhibit multiple equilibria CHO and KREPS, 1987 , which are also unusually sensitive to assumptions regarding payoffs (BINMORE, 1991) . The main problem with dynamic games in extensive form as models of conflict, however, is that they do not scale well. From a very early point onwards (ISAACS, 1965) , it has been recognized that piling on additional complexities typical of real conflict dynamics tend to increase the tedium of finding the (set of) solutions. These models can be used to bring out general points (such as the role of asymmetric information and signalling in explaining the emergence of war), but are unsuitable for a detailed study of particular instances of conflixt.
We will now demonstrate, by way of example, that the same holds for differential games. Even more than in the case of dynamic games, the problem is not just that finding a solution turns out to be laborious, and that there may be many potential equilibria, but that the apparatus of mathematics in its present state does not afford general solutions. The move from pure conflict to mixed motive games -which are more appropriate for the analysis of post Cold War, asymmetric scenarios -exacerbates this situation.
A simple differential game model of military conflict
Differential game approaches to modeling conflict are not new. They are an extension to optimal control theory that received much attention in the time after World War II. Researchers in the USSR (PONTRYAGIN, 1962 ) and the US (BELLMAN, 1957) independently looked for dynamic programming approaches to classical calculus of variations problems.
The pioneering application of differential equations models to military conflict is the famous LANCHESTER (1916) model where agents do not optimise. Early applications of differential games with optimising agents on military conflicts mainly focused on how vehicles trying to collide with a rationally evading vehicle would, or could, achieve contact or minimize distance in a given timeframe. 10 This kind of research would easily fit into a constant-sum framework and was well-suited for application.
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The rise of mixed-motive games (SCHELLING, 1960) prompted an application of differential games to wider strategic questions. Most of the papers on military problems, however, concerned arms races -on this, see DEGER and SEN (1984); CHANG et al. (1996) ; LEE (2007) -, and technical problems often prevented full solutions to be given. Applications to non-military conflict were relatively more numerous, 12 which we attribute to the fact that it is easier to avoid non-linear formulations in the 200 Á Klaus B. Beckmann and Lennart Reimer
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Also known as pursuit-evasion games -see ISAACS (1965) for examples.
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A notable systematic review and extension of these zero-sum problems is TAYLOR (1970, 1972) .
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"Relatively" is the term in point. The application of differential games to the study of nonmilitary conflict, for example in resource economics (CLARK, 1979) , still constitutes a small body of literature. latter case (see our discussion in subsection 3.2.3 below). Still, neither of the two approaches can be called a "hot" topic of research in economics, although neither the importance of military conflict nor its prevalance seem to have subsided since the 1970s.
We now introduce a new differential game model of dynamic conflict that builds on the discussion in sub-section 2.2. We will then use this model to identify the issues preventing the differential game treatment of military conflict from going forward.
Model setup
We analyze a dynamic conflict of known length T. There are two parties to the conflict, a defender called d and an attacker called a, who commit resources xðtÞ and yðtÞ out of a common pool rðtÞ to the conflict at each point of time t. These resource commitments build up force levels aðtÞ and dðtÞ according to the differential equations _ dðtÞ ¼ xðtÞ À β d dðtÞ ð 4Þ _ aðtÞ ¼ yðtÞ À β a aðtÞ ð 5Þ
where the β i s denote the depreciation rates of the respective force levels. The initial force levels at t ¼ 0 are assumed to be known
Upon termination of the conflict, the remaining resources rðTÞ are distributed among the parties according to the above mentioned contest success function (1). The model is therefore a straightforward extension of the simple static model discussed in subsection 2.2. In addition, however, we assume that accumulated forces provide a constant unit benefit of κ, which we interpret as the benefits of power conferred by being in possession of a "fleet in being". On the other hand costs of force aquisition occur, which are measured by the cost functions Ð T 0 xðtÞ 2 dt and Ð T 0 yðtÞ 2 dt respectively.
The objective functionals of the parties are (with zero discounting)
where σ describes the value of one unit of the acquired resource in terms of the objective function. The resource stock depletes according to the kinematic equation _ rðtÞ ¼ ÀχxðtÞ À γyðtÞ ð 10Þ and the initial level of the resource is assumed to be known
We have to impose the additional constraints that the overall resources can never be fully depleted and that force levels be non-negative.
Analysis
The situation above is said to be a differential game in the Bolza form since its objective functionals include additional salvage values for the resource rðtÞ after T is reached. The Hamiltonians for this problem can be written as follows:
H a ¼ κaðtÞ À yðtÞ 2 þ αðtÞ ðyðtÞ À β a aðtÞÞ þ ϱ a ðtÞ ðÀχxðtÞ À γyðtÞÞ ð13Þ
For calculations we introduce the adjoint (co-state) variables δðtÞ and αðt) which describe the shadow prices of the "fleets in being" as well as ϱ d and ϱ a which describe the shadow price of the resource rðtÞ. Since the resource is only collected at time T , its shadow price has to be constant over the whole period. By using Pontryagin's Maximum Principle (PONTRYAGIN, 1962) we can find the optimal controls xðtÞ Ã and yðtÞ Ã . Inserting them into the state equations (4, 5, 10) yields the differential equations for the optimal trajectories dðtÞ; aðtÞ; rðtÞ which combined with the adjoint equations _ δðtÞ; _ αðtÞ; _ ϱ d ðtÞ; _ ϱ a ðtÞ result in a system of partial differential equations (PDE).
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The resolution of conflict at time T and the resulting allocation of the remaining common pool resource rðT Þ is captured by the transversality conditions which we can find by differentiating the salvage values with respect to rðT Þ. Since the accumulated forces are of no further value for the objective after the conflict terminates, the corresponding transversality conditions for α and δ at time T must have the value 0. This also fixes the ϱ i ðtÞs at a constant level. As a result, the above system is simple enough to afford a closed-form solution, which we give in the appendix. However, the main features of the solution are best demonstrated by way of a numerical example illustrating the equilibrium paths of key variables: We find that unless the rate of depreciation is too high, military build-up will be initially high and fall over time (see figure 2 for a typical example; lower depreciation levels lead to higher initial effort, ceteris paribus).
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See the appendix for the system's equations and for the solution. The economic intuition behind this result is that a rapid build-up allows the players to derive more consumption/power benefit from any given effort, c.p. As a result, optimal force levels can actually fall at the end of the planning horizon, i. e. a short time before the terminal "hot" phase of the conflict (as shown in figure 3) . Figure 4 plots the time paths of rðtÞ for this example. We see that the common pool depletes over time, which exemplifies the wasteful nature of conflict. In this scenario, lower depreciation levels lead to less exploitation of the resource, c.p. Yet, in models of this type it will never deplete completely because the shadow prices ϱ i ðT Þ of the resource at the termination of the game are positive (the positive gain from seizing parts of the resource). At first blush, the model discussed in this section appears to be a straightforward extension of the standard static model from sub-section 2.2. But note that while the build-up of forces -and the concomitant consumption of "fleets in being" -is dynamic, the resolution of the conflict over the common pool resource is not. We still model this as occurring in a single cataclysmic confrontation at the end of the dynamic game. Furthermore, the common pool is unproductive in our model.
By way of the transversality conditions, the single application of the ratio csf at time T determines a constant shadow price ϱ i ðtÞ of the resource, and the only dynamic aspect of the model is how optimally to distribute the effort undertaken in preparation for this conflict over time. This part of the model, in turn, basically involves an isolated trade-off between utility derived from a standing army on the one hand and depreciation on the other. The only strategic dimension at this point is that investment at time τ reduces the common pool available for both parties at all times t with T > t > τ.
A satisfactory model would treat dynamic conflict as a series of instantaneous battles in continuous time. However, we were unable to formulate such a model whose system of PDEs could be solved analytically while retaining a standard csf of either the ratio or logistic type. These csfs introduce non-linearities into the model, which can lead to problems in optimal control theory (FLEICHTINGER and HARTL, 1986) , and are typically avoided in differential games. 14 We thus end on the horns of a dilemma: either reduce the complexity of the model until it loses some essential features of conflict (e. g., adequate conflict resolution technology or true dynamism) or refrain from providing an analytical solution for the optimum. In fact, our analysis in the preceding sub-section 3.2.2 is fairly typical for applications of differential games to conflict theory in that the main argument is made by way of example -in other words, by simulating a solution.
A simulation of symmetric conflict between boundedly rational agents
The preceding section 3 makes the point that simulation cannot be avoided if we want to study models of dynamic conflict that include (a) a sequence of "battles" and (b) non-linear conflict success technologies. (A similar argument was proffered regarding the extension of dynamic non-cooperative games.) We now develop an example for such a simulation study. Our object in doing so is not only to address the shortcomings pointed out in the preceding section, but also to introduce a form of boundedly rational decision-making that appears helpful in simulation.
Model structure and software setup
Again, we base the model on the standard ratio contest success function (sub-section 2.2) with two players. In contrast to the differential game discussed previously (subsection 3.2), the analysis will now be done in discrete time, with one "battle" per period. As a result of this battle at time t, player i will lose an amount l i ðtÞ ¼ x j ðtÞ x i ðtÞ þ x j ðtÞ r i ðtÞ which his opponent, player j, will gain as "booty" (r denotes the players' resources, 15
x their effort levels, and i; j 2 fA; Bg with i 6 ¼ j). Resources not devoted to fighting Dynamics of military conflict: an economics perspective Á 205
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(rðtÞ À xðtÞ) will be used in production, with a productivity factor ϕ i > 1 which we allow to differ between players. Players act to increase their stock of the resource r (or, conversely, to avoid losses). They no longer maximize the discounted value of rðtÞ (or rðT Þ), however. Rather, agents are assumed to be boundedly rational and to exhibit a form of adaptive expectations. Their behaviour is characterized by what we call incomplete myopic "optimization". In particular, 1. effort in the first period x i ð1Þ for i 2 fA; Bg is exogenously given and may differ between players. This captures the operational readiness for war at the beginning of the conflict, 2. in choosing their efforts at time t > 1, players assume that their opponent will continue as in the previous period, 3. each player will compute the static best response x We report on two typical results. First, we consider the case where player B has a higher resource endowment as well as higher productivity, while player A's initial readiness is higher than B's. Arguably, this captures some basic features of the situation at the beginning of World War 2 in both the Pacific and European theatres. In both cases, Allies enjoyed material superiority, 18 as well as more productive resources, while the Axis powers had the advantage in a higher mobilisation of their military and economies, and concentrated their forces.
Dynamics of military conflict: an economics perspective Á 207 ------------- Figure 6 on page 16 plots the resource levels for both parties over time. The plot illustrates that A (whose plot is labelled 1) typically enjoys some initial successes, but that after some time the higher productivity and greater resources of B turn the scales.
19 B's economy actually exhibits positive net growth in the final phase of the conflict, which precedes A's defeat. This pattern emerges because of the way we have modelled bounded rationality: adaptive expectations give rise to hysteresis, and the inability of players to implement their (static) plan immediately (finite reaction speeds) means that an initial higher readiness has the potential to influence the course of events for some time. For small differences in resource endowments, it can win the war. The second example concerns the reaction speed, which we have already identified as a key component of our model. Much military thinking emphasises the speed of decision-making (SIMPKIN, 1998; FRIESER, 2005; LEONHARD, 1994) . We set up the second simulation in such a way that the two parties are exactly alike, except for the fact that A reacts more quickly than B (in the sense that it can adapt more quickly to the contemporaneous static optimum).
Figure 7 on page 16 shows an example plot for this type of simulation. We find that the "faster" decision-maker -or, if you will, the party able to implement change 208 Á Klaus B. Beckmann and Lennart Reimer
Admiral Yamamoto, when asked by Japan's prime minister in the summer of 1941 about the outlook for an attack on the US, reportedly said "I shall run wild considerably for the first six months or a year, but I have utterly no confidence for the second and third years." (GAILEY, 1995, 68). faster -typically comes out on top, all other things being equal. This is in line with established military thinking. It also bolsters our confidence in the particular model of bounded rationality we developed for our simulations.
Figure 7:
A "Race to the Swift" (SIMPKIN, 1998) scenario -plot of resource levels over time Interestingly enough, our simulation study can also help to illustrate the limits of (bounded) rationality. Specifically, when pitting a boundedly rational agent as described above against a randomizing opponent, the latter has a nonzero probability of winning.
Conclusion
These simulation exercises, albeit simple, illustrate how simulation can be employed to extend the basic static model of conflict. We also use them as a framework for a new and (we hope) convincing way to model adaptive, boundedly rational decisions in dynamic conflict. As a result, plausible patterns of conflict dynamics emerge, which we can link to both historical conflict and standard tenets of military theory.
This compares favorably to the computational effort and theoretical difficulty involved in trying to find analytical solutions and characterize equilibria in both dynamic and differential games. In particular, we can now use a standard ratio contest success function, which cannot be done in an analytical approach unless one is prepared to settle for a model that is not truly dynamic in the sense that (periodic, instantaneous) success in conflict is determined continually as the dynamics unfold. 
